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CONVERGENCE ANDGROWTHLINKAGES BETWEEN NORTH ANDSOUTH
ABSTRACT
Using cross-sectional data for 98 countries for 1960-85,
this paper shows that growth of per capita GDP depends negatively
on initial income levels, as implied by the convergence
hypothesis, as well as on international differences in investment
rates in physical and human capital. There is some evidence of
slight economies of scale (1.06) among the industrial countries.
The evidence in favour of the convergence hypothesis is strongest
for the countries of the OECD and Latin America, and weakest for
Asia. Growth in Latin America and Africa is lower than elsewhere
even after allowing for international differences in initial
income levels, scale, schooling and capital investment. Analysis
of Solow residuals for the OECD countries (for which capital
stock data are available) shows convergence in rates of technical
progress, suggesting that convergence of per capita GDPs is not
Just a function of differences in investment rates. The linkage
between per capita GDP and the real exchange rate is found to be
strong for the OECD and Asia, weak for Africa and negative for
Latin America.
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andNBER1. INTRODUCTION
Inthis paper we report some evidence on the longer term growth linkages among
countries, especially between the industrialized and developing countries. Our starting point will
be the fairly well established finding that there has been significant convergence in per capita
growth rates among the industrialized countries over the thirty years since l96O, hut little
evidence of convergence between the industrialized and developing countries2. The central
question we ask is: What are the conditions that appear to enable a country to enter a period of
sustained growth that offers the prospect of convergence toward the income and productivity
levels of the richer industrialized countries? Our tool for analysis will be an empirical framework
explaining comparative growth performance over the 1960-85 period in a way that allows
simultaneously for convergence in per capita GDP,forpossible returns to scale, and for
international differences in investment rates in human and physical capital. We shall be
especially on the look-out for evidence that the prospects for convergence differ by income level
or region, or are characterized by possible threshold effects, We shall also be trying to assess
For some discussion of the evidence, see Abramovitz (1979, 1990), Baumol (1986),
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) and Maddison (1982).
2 De Long (1988) suggests that the evidence for the richest countries may be due to sample
selection bias. Other studies suggest that the evidence for the industrial countries is relatively
robust to sample choice, but does not extend to the poorer countries, at least in terms of a simple
negative correlation between starting values and subsequent growth of per capita incomes. See
Baumol and Wolff (1988), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989),
Chenery Robinson and Syrquin (1986) and Landes (1990). Factors advanced to explain the
inability of many of the poorer countries to achieve the "social capability' (Abramovitz 1990)
to "take off" (Rostow 1978) into sustained growth have included literacy (Rauch 1989), nutrition
(Dasgupta 1991), high inflation rates (Gylfason 1990), poor macroeconomic policies (Fischer
1991), unequal wealth distribution (Alesina and Rodrick 1991) and education (Barro 1991,
Romer 1989 and others). l'he evidence on the role of population growth is reviewed by Brander
and Dowrick (1991).2
whether convergence in the growth rates of GDI per capita, to the extent it is taking place. is
due entirely to higher investment rates in the countries catching up. or is due to international
transfers of technology that permit faster growth of efficiency levels in the initially poorer
countries4.
The next section sets the stage by reviewing previous studies. Section 3 then presents our
new results on convergence by income class and region, while the subsequent section deals with
the important ancillary linkage between per capita GDP and real exchange rates. The concluding
section sketches some possible implications of these results for analyzing the linkages between
North and South.
2.SOME THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESULTS ON CONVERGENCE
Ourempirical analysis starts with an extended formofthe Solow (1956,1957) growthmodel,
as augmented by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990) to include human capital accumulation, with
real output determined as a Cobb-Douglas function of physical capital, human capital and
efficiency units of labour:
This is what is implied by the augmented Solow model used by Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1990), since in their model the technology index grows at the same rate in each country.
" This possibility is central to the internationalconvergence modelling in Helliwell and
Chung (1988, 1990a, 1990b), since the variable being explained, in part by convergence, is the
'Solow residual' that already takes account of international differences in the rate of
accumulation of physical capital.3
(I) Y(t) =K(t)H(t)#(A(t)L(t))'nJ
where H is thestockof human capital, L thestockof labour (growing at rate n), K the stock
of physical capital and A the level of technology, growing at the constant5 rate g. The
coefficients imply constant returns to all factors taken together, and hence diminishing returns
to any combination of physical and human capital. If sk is the fraction of output invested in
physical capital and sh the fraction invested in human capital. then in the steady state the log of
output per capita is:
(2) ln[Y(t)/L(t)] =lnA(0)+ gt -((a+/'3)I(l-cx-13))ln(n+g+6)
(cxl(l-cr-f3))ln(sJ+ (j3/(l-a-I3))ln(sJ
This framework is extended to include the possibility of what Mankiw eta!. call
"conditional convergence", that if each country starts at some level of output that differs from
its steady state value, there will be convergence towards the steady state growth path for that
country. This need not imply that all countries have the same equilibrium level of income per
capita (they argue that the level of A can be different across countries, based on variations in
The assumption of a constant growth rate for the technology index marks an important distinction
between the Mankiw eta!.framework and the one we have employed earlier using a mixture of time-
series and cross-sectional data to explain international differences in growth rates of productivity. In our
framework (as developed and tested in Helliwell, Sturm and Salou. 1985. Helliwell and Chung, 1988,
1990a, 1990h. and Hansson and 1-lelliwell, 1990) there is international convergence in the rate of growth
of technical progress. We make some tests of this assumption against the alternative of constant technical
progress, especially in Helliwell and Chung (1988, l990a), and find significant rejection of the constant
growth assumption. Our results are also consistent with those of Bernard and Durlauf (1991), who find
time series evidence that series for output per capita in the industrial countries do not have the same
stochastic trends. However, for purely cross-sectional work, as long as we are dealing with per capita
GDP rather than Solow residuals, there is no operational distinction in the functional forms to he
estimated, so we make use of the Mankiw eta!.simplitying assumption in our exposition here.4
naturalresources,institutions, and other factors unrelated to the stocks of human and physical
capital) or even the same growth rate, since the equilibriumgrowthrate for each country will
depend on its populationgrowthand investmentinhumanandphysical capital.The Solowmodel
augmented for human capital accumulation predicts that the rate of convergence of each country
towards its steady state growth path will be at the proportional rate X, where
(3) X = (n+g+c5)(l-a-3).
The log difference between current income per effective worker and that in any given
earlier period 0 is thus given by
(4) ln(y(t)) - ln(y(O)) = (l-et)(a/(l—a-))ln(s + (l-e>")(f3/(1-a-I3))ln(sb)
- (I -e')((a +$)/( 1 -c—fl))In(n +g + b) - (1 _eXo)ln(y(0)).
Applied by Mankiw et a!. to a cross-sectional sample of the growth experience of 98
countries from 1960 to 1985, this equation seemed to fit the experience of the developing as well
as the industrial countries. There was evidence of conditional convergence for the whole sample
of countries, as well as for the more restricted sample of industrial countries. Their results also
showed that allowing for the accumulation of human capital lowered the estimated coefficient
on physical capital to a level that was consistent with capital's share in output, and hence with
the Cobb-Douglas assumption of constant returns to scale. Mankiw er a!. interpreted their results
as a vindication of the augmented Solow model, and an implicit rejection of the increasing5
number of models built on the assumption that knowledge spillovers created the likelihood of
increasing returns to scale at the national level!'
The Mankiw et al model differs in a fundamental way from the one we have used
earlier7 to study convergence. In the Mankiw et al framework, ,the productivity index may have
a different level in each country (to account for resource endowments, etc.). but has the same
exogenous growth rate in each country. Although we used a similar production structure to
Mankiw et al8, we assumed that the efficiency indexes initially grow at different rates in each
country, with convergence taking place in the rates of growth, and possibly in the levels, of the
technology indexes. Thus international transfers of knowledge are given a central role in
convergence, with the initially poorer countries able to have efficiency levels that grow faster
than those in the initially richer countries. This is because the initially poorer countries are able
to make use of current best practice procedures already in use in the more productive economies.
If this approach is correct, it offers enhanced growth prospects for all countries that have the
necessary conditions to be in the 'convergence club', since growth of per capita incomes can be
6 For examples, see Romer (1986, l990a, 1990b) and Lucas (1988, 1990). Alternative
endogenous growth models by Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1990a, 1990b) assume economies
of scale and knowledge spillovers at the industry level, which has no necessary implications for
returns to scale at the national level. See Helpman (1991) for a helpful survey.
In Helliwell Sturm and Salou (1985) and Helliwell and Chung (199la) t'or the G-7, in
Helliwell and Chung (1990a) for 19 industrial counties, and in Helliwell and Chung (l990b) for
19 industrial and 8 Asian economies.
8 We have made use of a CES form, while they use Cobb-Douglas, but our elasticity of
substitution is so close to 1.0 that our CES form has properties almost identical to the Cobb-
Douglas. A potentially more important difference is that they account for international
differences in human capital, while we did not do so in our earlier work,6
faster in the poorer countries without requiring higher levels of investment than in the richer
countries, although of course that channel for convergence also remains available.
Because our earlier studies dealt with countries for which we were able to construct
measures of the physical capital stock, we were able to obtain explicit measures of the 'Solow
residuals'9, and to see whether they showed evidence of convergence. In our combined time
series and cross-section studies, the results for the industrial countries provided strong evidence
of international convergence of the growth rates of the Solow residuals'°. Thus our results
rejected quite strongly the assumption of an unchanging rate of technical progress". However,
it is possible that our rejection of constant technical progress, and our finding of international
convergence in its growth rate, was due to the fact that our production function did not make
explicit allowance for the growth of human capital. For example, if the countries with initially
lower levels of productivity were also those with the highest rates of investment in human
capital, then our measures of the Solow residual, which are derived from a production structure
with only employment and physical capital, might appear to show productivity growth
convergence where none really existed. To deal finally with that possibility, it will be necessary
The Solow residuals are obtained by inverting equation (1) to define a measured series for
A (t) using actual values for Y and K, and using the number of employees to represent the
labour input HL.
'°Our results also showed rejection of long-term international equality of the levels of the
efficiency indexes. Thus our experiments confirmed the Mankiw et at hypothesis that there are
likely to be continuing international differences in the levels of the efficiency index.
"Our tests of the convergence model were against an alternative hypothesis of a country-
specific constant rate of technical progress. The data reject even more strongly the assumption
of an unchanging rate of technical progress that is the same in each country. We also found
some evidence (in Helliwell and Chung 1990a) that the growth of productivity indexes was faster
in countries which had the fastest rates of growth in their openness to international trade, as
measured by the ratio of exports to GDP.7
to develop some measures of variations over time in the level of human capital, to guard against
the possibility that leaving out human capital growth is falsely suggesting international
convergence of productivity growth rates. That is an important topic on ourresearch agenda.
However, for the present paper, we shall concentrate on estimating cross-sectional equations of
the sort used by Mankiw et a!., since they are also consistent with our preferred production
structure. The difference lies in the interpretation of the constant term, which in the Mankiw et
a!. framework is just the logarithm of the ratio of equilibrium incomes. In our framework, the
estimated constant term in a cross-sectional regression is a function of the equilibrium level
differences as well as the speed of convergence of growth rates, and the initial level differences,
of the productivity indexes. We shall also test more directly for convergence in the rates of
growth of productivity indexes by using the more complete data available for the industrial
countries.
An earlier paper (Helliwell 1991) used a framework rather like that of Mankiw et a!. to
consider whether there were some threshold levels of education below which convergence could
not take place. The results suggested that there were no material threshold effects for education,
and that the Mankiw et a!. log-linear specification was roughly appropriate. That paper also
added a direct test for economies of scale, and found some evidence of a low degree of scale
economies for the industrial countries, with some possibility of lesser effects for the world
sample as a whole. In a companion paper to this one (Helliwell and Chung 1991b), we extend
the tests of economies of scale to see if they may apply over some range of country sizes, if not
over the entire world sample, and compare the convergence process across countries with that
applicable among regions within a given country.8
3. CONVERGENCE RKSULTS BY INCOME LEVEL AND REGION
In this paper, we want to push harder on the tentative conclusion that the above
model of conditional convergence, augmented further by the possibility of some returns to scale,
is equally applicable to countries at all income levels. Our tests of the applicability of the model
of conditional convergence to the developing countries will be based on dividing the sample by
region as well as ordering it by average levels of income per capita: In this way we can see if
it is true, as the Mankiw et a!. global results seem to suggest, that the same model of
convergence is equally applicable at all levels of development and in all parts of the world.
Our first result, as shown in Table I, is a replication of the Mankiw eta!.
cross-sectionalestimation of equation (4) explaining the 1960-1985 growth in real GDP per adult
for 98 countries. The second equation imposes the parameter restrictions implied by equation
(4), which are accepted quite easily, chiefly by means of shifting the weakly estimated
coefficient on the final term. The third equation shows the effects of adding a variable measuring
the average scale of each of the countries, being the log of the mean of each country's average
real GOP per capita over the period from 1960 to 198512. The final equation adds the
'2An earlier paper (Flelliwell 1991) used the log of 1960 real GDP as the measure of scale,
which gave smaller and less significant estimates of the scale effects. Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe
(1991) also use the log of initial GDP as their scale variable, and find no significant scale effects
in the growth of GDP per capita (although they do find some scale effects in manufacturing).
For an estimation covering a number of years, it makes a difference whether initial or average
scale is used, and the theoretical preference must be for average scale, since it provides the
appropriate discrete time analogue of a continuous time equation in which the growth rate
depends on current relative scale. In addition, if there are errors of measurement in initial scale,
they will be correlated to some extent with initial real GDP per adult, which appears negatively
in the dependent variable. This will cause the estimate of the scale effect to be biased
downward. Using end-of-sample scale would have the opposite effect, so that using the sample
average serves to eliminate this source of bias if the errors in measurement are of approximately9
parameter restrictions, once again with little loss in goodness of fit or change in the key
parameter estimates. All four equations show strong convergence effects, even though the
industrial countries, the group for which convergence has previously been shown, make up less
than one-quarter of the sample.
Marikiw et al treat the empirical success of their model, which assumes constant
returns to scale, and has an investment coefficient small enough to te consistent with the
augmented Solow model, as evidence that increasing returns to scale are not required to explain
international differences in growth rates. However, by adding the scale variable, we provide a
more direct test of the returns to scale assumption. The results suggest significant evidence of
slight economies of scale, with each 10% increase in size being associated with an increase in
the annual growth rate of .062/25=.0025, or 0.25%. Our estimate of .062 for economies of
scale is only one-sixth as large as suggested by the example calculations reported by Lucas
(1990). We shall return later to a direct test of the Mankiw et al assumption of constant growth
in the technical progress index. First we disaggregate the data sample by income class, to see
if the new evidence of convergence applies equally to rich and poor countries.
The results are shown in Table 2, where the basic cross-sectional equation is
repeated for each of four quartiles, separated according to their average levels of real GDP per
adult for the 1960-1985 sample period. The most noteworthy feature of the results is that
conditional convergence is stronger within each one of the income groupings than it is for the
world as a whole, white all of the other variables are generally weaker within the groupings than
the same relative size over the sample period.10
for the world sample. Thus it would appear that some measure of economic closeness, as
measured by income per capita, is helpful for defining groups of countries among which
convergence is likely to take place. Within the income groupings, there appears to be little
explanatory power in the schooling measure of human capital investment, little or no evidence
of returns to scale, and modest impact from differing investment rates. Thus it would appear that
these latter variables have more importance in explaining growth differences between the richer
and poorer groups of countries than they do in explaining growth differences among countries
with similar levels of income per capita. Subsidiary tests were run to see if the differences
among the coefficients for different income classes are individually or collectively significant,
as for a smaller sample of countries by Dowrick and Gemmell (1991). The only significant
difference is in the constant terms, which are significantly lower for the lower income groups:
once the separate constant terms are allowed for, permitting separate slope coefficients for any
of the other variables does not significantly alter the results.'3
' If the final equation of Table 1 is re-estimated with separate constant terms for each of
the income quartiles, the pooled slope coefficients are as follows, with standard errors in
brackets: scale .059 (.0 17); cu -.800 (.062); investment-(n+g+d) .323 (.057); school-(n+g+d)
.079 (.043). The constant term for the richest countries is 6.200 (.602), from which the
following terms are subtracted for the three poorer quartiles, respectively: -.573 (.086) ; -.940
(.124); and -1.58 (.152). For the equation as a whole, the standard error of estimate drops from
.317 to .212, and the adjusted R2 rises from .495 to .775 with the addition of the quartile
intercepts. The constraint that all slope coefficients are the same (relative to the case where they
are different for each income class) is accepted easily (p=.72). The sharp rise in the Cu
coefficient when the separate constant terms are admitted raises the possibility of econometric
problems, since initial income used to define the starting point for convergence also enters
negatively in the dependent variable, which is the log difference between real per capita GOP
in 1960 and 1985. To test the possible size of this bias, the equation was estimated using
instrumental variables with initial income removed from the list of eligible instruments, replaced
by the log average per capita GDP and a rank ordering of the same series. Average income
avoids the econometric risk posed by initial income, since any bias caused by the negative
correlation between initial income and growth would be offset by a corresponding positive
correlation between growth and ending income. As expected, this slightly lowers the
convergence coefficient, to .624 (with standard error .068) in the equation with separate constant
terms and to .203 (with standard error .068) in the equation with a single constant. These resultsII
Figures 1 through 4 show the relation between growth rates and initial income for
each of the four groups of countries, where the growth rates are adjusted for differences in
education, investment and scale, using the estimated coefficients in the final equation of Table
114. The figures allow the outliers from the global regression plane to be identified, and hence
may help to provide clues about some of the important dimensions that may be mising from our
attempts to explain international differences in growth experience. It can be seen from the
figures that the correlation between growth and GDP, after allowing for the etimated effects
of education, investment and scale, is substantial for all four country groupings, but tighter for
the two richer than for the two poorer quartiles5.
In Table 3, we examine the results by continent, to see whether geographic
proximity is important in defining groups of countries among which convergence is expected to
take place. For Latin America and the OECD, and to a slightly lesser extent Africa, convergence
is significant and slightly larger than for the world sample, while there is no evidence of
convergence in Asia. There appear to be no scale effects in any region except the OECD.
Investment effects are largest and most significant in Asia, while schooling does not appear to
suggest even more strongly that the Mankiw et al specification, even when augmented by
investment and schooling effects, does not fully capture the difference in the growth performance
of the richest and poorest countries. Although, there is still no evidence of significant differences
in the slope coefficients among the income classes, the significant differences in the constant
terms raise the possibility of continuing medium-term divergence of growth rates between rich
and poor countries.
'4The adjustment is done by setting the investment, education and scale variables at sample
average values when the hypothetical growth rates are calculated. The country residuals are then
added to the predicted values to get the observations shown in the figures. We analyze the
separate effects of scale in Helliwell and Chung (l991b).
'The correlation coefficients are -.836 and -.812 for Figures 1 and 2, compared to -.530
and -.778 for Figures 3 and 4.12
have significant effects within any of the regions. More precise tests of regional differences are
obtained by adding separate regional intercepts and slope coefficients to the 98-country equation.
Only the African and Latin American intercepts have t-values with absolute values greater than
1 .0, and both show slower growth than the global equation would predict. None of the slope
coefficients are significantly different by region.
Figures 5 through 8 show on a regional basis the relationship between initial
incomes and growth rates, once again after allowing for investment, education and scale effects
using the coefficients from the restricted global equation in Table 1.
Figure 5 shows relatively weak convergence among the African countries, with
South Africa a clear outlier in having more growth than its high initial income would predict.
The slow growers, relative to predicted, were Zaire, Ghana and Zambia, perhaps reflecting their
dependence on primary exports'6.
Figure 6 shows clearly the relative lack of success of the convergence model as
applied to Asia, with Hong Kong and Singapore growing much faster than convergence would
suggest, and India much slower. Without those three countries, the remainder would support a
negative relationship, once account was taken of differences in investment, education and scale
'6Aside from the general decline in the export prospects for these commodities over the
1960-1985 period, there is also the possibility, raised by Eswaran and Kotwal (1989), that
expanding trade between exporters of land-intensive primary products and exporters of labour-
intensive manufactured goods may reduce the real wages of the former in such a way as to give
them lower per capita GDP.13
effects'7. Figure 7 shows relatively strong convergence effects for Latin America, with no
major exceptions evident.
From Figure 8 for the industrial countries, it can be seen that the strong
convergence effect is not simply due to the experience of Japan, since there is a substantial
number of countries spread over the range of growth rates and initial per-adult levels of real
GDP. It is noteworthy that two of the countries with the lowest growth rates, relativelo the
predicted values, are Australia and New Zealand. This is what we would expect, since both are
countries which derived a large fraction of their 1960 incomes from pastoral and other
land-intensive activities whose terms of trade and relative activity levels suffered over the
subsequent 25 years. A similar natural resource effect, but with the opposite sign, is provided
by Norway, whose oil wealth was discovered, developed, and brought into full production
during the 25-year period.
Comparing Figures 5 through 8, it is apparent that convergence applies much
more closely to the growth experiences of Latin America and the OECD than to Africa and
Asia, even after allowing for differences in investment, education, and scale. The need for
additional explanatory factors is especially obvious in the case of Asia, where the correlation
between initial income and subsequent growth is not even of the expected signlS.
'71f Hong Kong, Singapore and India are removed from the sample, the correlation between
initial income and adjusted growth is -.671 for the remaining countries.
The correlation between initial income and growth, after allowing for the estimated effects
of other variables, is -.417 for Africa, and +.292 for Asia, compared to -.823 for Latin
America and -.862 for the OECD.14
Looking at the results from Tables 2and 3 together, it would appear that
the convergence results are more robust by region and income grouping than are those for
education, investment, and scale. Conversely, it would appear that adding these latter variables,
and especially education and investment, is important for explaining the growth variations among
regions, and between the richest and the poorest countries.
We now turn, in Table 4, to attempt a more direct test of whether technical
•progress grows at the same constant rate in each country, as supposed by Mankiw et al, or
whether it grows faster in the poorer countries, as suggested in our earlier work. In these
experiments, we are limited to the group of 19 OECD countries we studied in earlier papers,
since that is the sample for which we have comparable data for employment and stocks of
physical capital. The first equation repeats the OECD equation of Table 3, using the Mankiw
et al data, but with 19 instead of 22 countries. The smaller sample makes no material difference
totheresults. The second equation continues with the 19-country sample, but uses the OECD
national accounts data instead oftheMankiw et al data. This leads to some increase in the
investment effect, and to some reduction in the overall explanatory power oftheequation.
The third equation continues to use the OECD national accounts data, but changes
the dependent variable from the growth of real GDP per adult to the growth of the Solow
residual. If technical progress grows at the same constant rate in each country, then there should
be no convergence effect apparent in the Solow residual, and hence the initial productivity level
should drop out of the equation. The results show that this does not happen, and that the initial
productivity level has a strong negative effect, even though the schooling variable remains in the15
equation to guard against the possibility that ignoring international differences in human capital
had been responsible for our earlier finding.
The results also show no effect for investment. This is as one would expect in an
equation for SoIow residuals, since the effect of capital growth is already built into the dependent
variable. However, if there were important capital embodiment effects in the implementation of
technical progress, then one might expect to find that countries with higher investment rates had
higher productivity growth rates. Similarly, if capital investment had important external effects,
through the creation of knowledge spillovers at the national level, then one might also expect
to find a positive effect from the investment rate. Neither of these influences appears to be
important in this sample of industrial countries. Finally, the insignificance of the schooling
variable may suggest that the secondary school enrollment rate is an inadequate measure of the
differences in human capital among the industrial countries, where differences in higher
education and research may be more important.
4.CONVERGENCE AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
We areinterested inseveralkey issues. First, is it still true, as pointed out earlier
by Kravis and Lipsey (1983), Hill (1986) and Heston and Summers (1988), that thereis a
significant positive relationship between a country's real exchange rate and its relative GDP?If
so, is that relationship one that is maintained in a fairly stable way from one decade tothe next?
If the relationship is stable, and if convergence of per capita real GDPs is a powerful tendency,
then we might expect to find some lessening of the cross-sectional variations of both real per
capita incomes and of real exchange rates from decade to decade.16
In assessing the evidence we must distinguish, as Barro and Sala i Martin (1990.
1991) point out, what they call 3 convergence from what they call a convergence.
convergence, which in the terminology that we have adopted for this paper should be referred
to as k convergence (as defined in equation (3)). relates to the partial convergence effect that we
and others have found to be significant, as evidenced by the coefficients on the initial income
variable, a convergence relates to what happens to the cross-sectional variation in per capita real
incomes as time passes. There are several reasons why significant j3 or k convergence need not
imply a convergence. Barro and Sala i Martin emphasize the fact that different countries are
likely to be subject to different disturbances, and that the variance of these disturbances may not
be constant from decade to decade. in addition, since we are interested in the a for real
exchange rates as well as for real incomes, there is the question of disturbances to real exchange
rates as well as to real incomes.
The correlations in Table 5 show that for the 98-country sample as a whole there
have been no noticeable decade-to-decade trends in a for cross-sectional variations of real
exchange rates, real GDP per capita or real GDP per adult. Similarly, there has been little
apparent trend in the correlation between real exchange rates and real per capita GDPs.
Disaggregating by average income, there appears to have been a convergence for real incomes,
but not for real exchange rates, within the richer two quartiles. There appears to be a divergence
for both real incomes and real exchange rates in the two poorer quartiles. As for the correlation
between real exchange rates and real incomes, it is strong among the countries in the richest
quartile, and effectively zero in the three other quartiles. This appears to contrast with the
'9Although the l980s show some apparent lessening of the correlation between real incomes
and real exchange rates.17
resultsin Helliwell and Chung (1990b), where we found a consistently strong correlation
between real incomes and real exchange rates for the industrial countries and for a group of
Asian economies. To reconcile these two results, we turn now to consider the correlations on
a regional basis, as reported on a decade-by-decade basis in Table 6 and depicted for 1985 in
Figures 9 though 12.
The results in Table 6 show strong correlations between real incomes and real
exchange rates for Asia and for the OECD, thus confirming the earlier results, but relatively
slight positive correlation in Africa and, for the 1980s, a negative correlation in Latin America.
As for the international variability of real incomes, there is some evidence of a convergence for
the OECD and for Latin America, while there is a divergence in Asia and Africa.
Figures 9 through 12 show the correlations for 1985 between real exchange rates
and real per capita GDPsinAfrica, Asia, Latin America and the OECD. As suggested by the
correlations reported for the 1980sinTable 6, there is a close positive relationship for Asia and
the OECD,amuch weaker one for Africa,anda slight negative relation for Latin America.
Regressions using per capita real GDP to explain cross-sectional variation in 1985 real exchange
rates for the 91 countries in the four regions reveal that the data accept a common relationship
applicable to Asia and the OECD countries, but strongly reject its applicability to Latin America
and Africa. For Asia and the OECD, the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to real
per capita GDP is .475 (t=9.6); this drops to . 146 for Africa and is -.295 for Latin America20.
20 The adjusted R for the 91-country equation is .531. The homogeneity of the slope
coefficients and constant terms for Asia and the OECD is not rejected (p=.33), while similar
restrictions are strongly rejected for Latin America (p=l(Y) and for Africa (p< 10').18
There is not space in this paper to dig much deeper into the reasons for these discrepancies, but
it seems likely that the relationship between real GDP and the real exchange rate is tighter for
more open economies and weaker where national inflation rates are higher and uncertain.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Whatare the main features of our results? The evidence from all countries
suggests that production structures ought to be modelled, especially for the developing countries,
in a way that takes account of the accumulation of human as well as physical capital21. The
evidence from the industrial countries, where there are fairly comparable measures of capital
stocks, and hence of Solow residuals, also suggests that there is evidence of international
convergence in the rates of technical progress. These results suggest, if they are subsequently
supported for the developing countries when better data become available relating to capital
stocks, that prospects for growth of real per capita incomes in the poorer countries are thus
brighter than they otherwise would have been. Earlier research for the industrial countries
also suggests that growth of Solow residuals has also been higher for countries that have had
faster relative increases in their foreign trade23. Since we have found significant differences in
growth patterns and experiences among the developing countries, this result linking trade growth
21 De Long and Summers (1991)suggest that it may be important to separate the various
types of investment, since they find equipment investment to have a much higher effect on
growth than does other forms of fixed investment. They also note the importance of allowing
for differences in the relative prices of investment goods. See also the results in Helliwell and
Chung (1990a) comparing business, private and total capital.
22As reported in Helliwell and Chung (1990a).
23Similar possibilities for productivity-enhancing trade growth are also noted by Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (l99la, 199lb).19
andproductivitygrowth should not be presumed to apply globally unless it is confirmed by
evidencefor the various groups of developing countries.
The applicabilityofthe convergence model differs substantially by region, with
its success being greatest for the OECD and Latin America,ratherless forAfrica, and
non-existent for Asia. Thus itwouldappear that a fuller explanation forthe diversityofAsian
growthexperiences will require more than the Solow model, even when augmentedbyhuman
capital,technological convergence andscaleeffects.
One surpriseinour current results is thatthe linkage betweenreal exchange rates
and realper capita incomes, which was foundto be strong and sustained for the OECD anda
sample ofAsian economies,turnsout to beof muchlessimportance forAfrica and Latin
America.Thismayreflectdifferencesin openness to trade, the prevalence of capitalcontrols
andrestrictedexchangerateregimesin Africaand LatinAmerica, or some otherfactors.Itmay
also be significant thataveragegrowth rates in Africa andLatinAmerica havebeenbelowthose
in other regions, even afterallowingfor different rates of investment in human andphysical
capital. This may suggest that international involvementsof the sortthatlead to tighter linkages
between realincomesandreal exchangerates mayalso leadto higheraveragegrowthrates.For
example,Gylfason (1990), Fischer(1991) and others have shown a linkagebetweenhigher
inflationrates and lower growth. Macroeconomicpoliciesthatlead to higherand/ormore
variable inflationratesapparently areassociated withloweraverage growth rates,evenafter
allowing for differences in initial incomes anddifferingrates of investment in physicaland20
humancapital24.These same types ofmacroeconomicpolicy that apparently have negative
effectsongrowthmayalso beresponsibleforthe looserlinkage betweenpercapitaGDP and
therealexchangerate. More research is clearly required to spell out thereasons forthe lesser
realexchangerate linkages,aswellas forthe lower growth rates, inbothAfrica and Latin
America.
Forthe modelling of longer-term real exchangerates,it might thereforebe
suitable to make use of the relationship between real incomes and real exchange rates for the
industrial and Asian economies, but not yet for Latin America and Africa. Even for the OECD
and Asian economies, the net predictive contribution of convergence and the real income linkage
for the modelling of subsequent exchange rate movements remains to be analyzed.
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Tests of Convergence for Rich and Poor Countries
For these equations the 98 observations are ranked by average GDP per adult 1960-1985, and
divided into quartiles. Scale is measured by average total GDP 1960-1985.
Quartile samples: 1st (1-24)2nd (23-48) 3rd (49-72) 4th (73-98)
No. of Observations 24 24 24 26
Degrees of Freedom 18 18 18 20
Constant 7.382 5.830 12.05 3.869
(1.289) (1.256) (3.522) (2.236)
Coefficients:
scale .037 .084 .056 .090
(.031) (.037) (.047) (.050)
cu -.817 -.846 -1.069 -.772
(.111) (.107) (.252) (.162)
invest .564 .222 .170 .338
(.198) (.156) (.164) (.108)
school .013 .071 .310 .022
(.212) (.117) (.120) (.077)
n+g+d -.233 -.226 .643 -.330
(.348) (.323) (.830) (.621)
R2 .776 .758 .581 .558
S.E.E. .203 .183 .278 .230
Note: Standarderrorsare in parentheses.Table 3
Tests of Convergence by Region
Regions Africa Asia Latin OECD 98 Country
America Sample
No. of
Observations 38 13 18 22 98
Degreesof
Freedom 32 7 12 16 90
Constant 2.826 2.665 5.050 1.864 3.454
Coefficients:
scale .076 -.108 .089 .061 .044
(.062) (.115) (.052) (.022) (.025)
cu -.402 .095 -.645 -.437 -.328
(.159) (.430) (.153) (.061) (.063)
invest .492 1.091 .269 .402 .539
(.134) (.373) (.211) (.148) .083
school .129 -.401 .236 .222 .117
(.096) (.339) (.224) (.122) .063
n+g+d -.223 -.083 -.048 -.935 -.106





.315 .505 .620 .751 .529
S.E.E. .370 .337 .223 .124 .306
Note:Standarderrorsareinparentheses.
*Withregional dummies for Africa and Latin America (Remainder includes OECD,Asia and
residue)Table 4
Comparisonof Convergence Results for the OECD
Using GDP per Adult and Siow Residuals, 1960-1985
GDP peradult GDP peradult Solow Residuals
M/RJW data OECD SNA datausing OECD SNA data
No. of Observations 19 19 19
Degrees of Freedom 13 13 13
Constant 3.246 1.606 26.620
Coefficients:
scale .054 .061 .069
(.023) (.023) (.024)
cu -.527 -.426 -.757
(.932 (.106) (.107)
invest .361 .594 -.005
(.162) (.251) (.255)
school .119 .121 -.110
(.154) (.154) (.161)
n+g+d -.665 -.253 .456
(.406) (.392) (.440)
.797 .702 .845
S.EE. .129 .123 .128
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
The Mankiw/Romer/Weil data are mainly from the Penn World Table (Mark4)(Heston and Summers 1988).
GDP is measured in 1980 international dollars. The OECD SNA data are from the 1990 OECD National
Accounts database.Purchasing power parities for 1985 are used to convert the GDP data into 1985
international dollars. The appendix contains more information on the data and the derivation of the Solow
residual. For regressions (1) and (2), the dependent variable is defined as the log difference in GDP per adult
over the period 1960-85, and Cu is the logarithm of 1960 gdp per adult. For regression (3) the dependent
variable is defined as the change in the logarithm of the Solow residual, and Cu is the 1960 logarithm of the
Solow residual. The sample used in the above regressions contains the following 19 countries: USA, Japan,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland,Table 5
RealExchange Ratca and RealGDPperCapita
Ranked by average GDP per adult and divided into quartiles.
1st qrt. 2nd qrt. 3rd qrt. 4th qrt. 98 Country
Real Exchange Rate (log)
Std Dcv's:60-85 .165 .209 .293 .263 .322
60's .193 .270 .298 .285 .325
70's .191 .220 .326 .276 .350
80's .166 .208 .349 .373 .372
Real GDP per Capita (log)
Std Dev's:60-85 .255 .313 .262 .272 1.05
60's .359 .387 .270 .308 .995
70's .255 .325 .290 .282 1.07
80's .262 .295 .345 .289 1.15
Real GDP per Adult (log)
Std Dcv's:60-85 .236 .271 .258 .275 .985
60's .354 .352 .288 .306 .948
70's .232 .280 .299 .281 1.01
80's .222 .253 .323 .293 1.06
Correlations between real exchange rate and Real GDP per Capita
60-85 .781 .034 -.023 .040 .587
60's .662 .021 .019 -.189 .506
70's .768 .136 -.039 .183 .589
80's .524 -.057 -.017 .058 .558
Correlations between real exchange rate and real C]DP per adult
60-85 .763 -.052 .076 .069 .580
60's .663 -.036 .085 -.179 .498
70's .697 .033 .015 .205 .577
80's .548 -.051 .083 .069 .560Table 6
Real Exchange Rates and Real GDP per Capita
Regional Evidence
Africa Asia Latin OECD
America
RealExchange Rate (log)
Std Dcv's:60-85 .240 .258 .159 .219
60's .279 .218 .216 .222
70's .246 .297 .167 .227
80's .286 .395 .199 .257
Real GDP per Capita (log)
Std Dev's:60-85 .555 .777 .458 .418
60's .525 .582 .524 .468
70's .563 .811 .443 .400
80's .647 .937 .436 .400
Real GDP perAdult(log)
Std Dcv's:60-85 .547 .742 .426 .395
60's .519 .593 .497 .464
70's .553 .790 .411 .384
80's .633 .877 .397 .371
Correlations betweenrealexchange rate and realGDPperCapita
60-85 .269 .762 .179 .877
60's .131 .513 .230 .752
70's .326 .736 .325 .857
80's .311 .865 -.188 .878
Correlation betweenreal exchange rate and realGDP perAdult
60-85 .276 .758 .l87 .868
60's .137 .527 .273 .745
70's .329 .726 .3l9 .843
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APPENDIX
Region country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
School
(8)
Growth GDP/ GDP/ Avg Avg AvgAvg
AdultAdult Growth GDP/ GDPInvest/ 1960-85
1960 1985GDP/Adult (Scale) GDP Working
Adult60—85 Age Pop
Quartile 1Data sorted byAvg GDP/Adult,col (4)=(col(1)+col(2))/2
1.5 OECDUnited S 1236218988 0.01715675 2.13E+09 21.18
OECDCanada1028617935 0.02214111 2.08E+08 23.35 10.6
OECDNorway 793819723 0.03613831 3.29E+07 29.19 100.7
OECDSwitzerl 1030815881 0.01713095 5.59E+07 29.79 4.8
OECDDenmark855116491 0.02612521 4.07E+07 26.61 10.7 0.6
OECDSweden 780215237 0.02711520 6.l8E+07 24.53 7.9 0.4
OECDGermany769515297 0.02711496 4.76E+08 28.58 8.4
OECDFrance 721515027 0.02911121 3.94E+08 26.24 8.9
OECDAustrali 844013409 0.01910925 9.63E+07 31.60 9.8 2
1.7 OECDNew Zeal. 952312308 0.01010916 1.99E+07 22.54
OECDBelgium678914290 0.03010540 7.04E+07 23.43 9.3
8.9
0.5
0.3 OECDUnited K 763413331 0.02210483 3.77E+08
OECDNetherla 768913177 0.02210433 9.74E+07 25.86 10.7
1.9 ResidTrinidad 925311285 0.00810269 6.58E+06 20.43
0.7 OECDFinland652713779 0.03010153 3.08E+07 36.91 11.5
0.4 OECDAustria593913327 0.0329633 4.80E+07 23.45
2.6 AsiaSingapor 279314678 0.0668736 9.21E+06 32.24
10.9 1.2 OECDJapan 349313893 0.0558693 6.53E+08
11.45 7 3.8 LatinVenezuel 103676336 —0.0208352 6.35E+07
















6543 1.24E+07 25.98 11.4 1.1
Quartile 2
3 2.3 AfricS. Afric 47687064 0.0165916 9.16E+07 21.67
3.3 LatinMexico 42297380 0.0225805 1.94E+08 19.59











5193 9.56E+07 25.34 5


















3971 2.69E+07 23.24 7.3
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AsiaKorea, R12854775 0.0533030 5.84E+07 22.3710.2 2.7













AfricTunisia 16233661 0.0332642 7.80E+06 13.89 4.3 2.4
Quartile 3
LatinDominica19393308 0.0212624 6.95E+06 17.185.8 2.9
AfricMauritiu19732967 0.0162470 1.18E+06 17.197.3 2.6
AfricBotswana9593671 0.0542315 7.77E+05 28.392.9 3.2
AsiaThailand13083220 0.036 2264 5.13E4-07 18.08 4.4 3.1
ResidPapua Ne17812544 0.0142163 3.75E+06 16.29 1.52.1
AsiaSri Lank17942482 0.0132138 1.42E+07 14.82 8.3 2.4
AsiaPhilippi16682430 0.0152049 5.07E+07 14.9310.6 3
LatinEl Salva2042 1997 —0.0012020 5.23E+06 8.043.9
LatinBolivia 16182055 0.0101837 5.94E+06 13.35 4.92.4
AfricCongo, P10092624 0.0381817 1.29E+06 28.82 3.8 2.4
AfricMorocco10302348 0.0331689 1.60E+07 8.343.6 2.5
AfricZimbabwe11872107 0.0231647 4.97E+06 21.12 4.4 2.8
LatinHonduras14301822 0.0101626 2.76E+06 13.853.7 3.1
AsiaPakistan10772175 0.0281626 5.86E+07 12.23 3 3
AfricIvory Co13861704 0.0081545 6.17E+06 12.452.3 4.3
AfricCameroon 8892190 0.0361540 5.62E+06 12.903.4
AfricEgypt 9072160 0.0351534 2.93E+07 16.33 72.5
AsiaIndonesi 8792159 0.0361519 1.OOE+08 13.904.1
AfricSenegal 13921450 0.0021421 3.65E+06 9.611.72.3
AfricAngola 1588 1171 —0.0121380 5.48E+06 5.851.82.1
AfricZambia 1410 1217 —0.0061314 3.44E+06 31.75 2.42.7
AfricMozambiq1420 1035 —0.0131228 7.42E+06 6.170.7 2.7
RegidHaiti 10961237 0.0051167 2.71E+06 7.101.9 1.3
Asia India 9781339 0.0131159 3.48E+08 16.82 5.1 2.4
Quartile 4
AfricSudan 1254 1038 —0.008 1146 1.05E+07 13.25 2 2.6
AfricKenya 9441329 0.0141137 7.57E+06 17.452.4 3.4
AfricNigeria 10551186 0.0051121 4.74E+07 12.002.3 2.4
AfricBenin 1116 1071 —0.002 1094 1.66E+06 10.82 1.8 2.4
AfricMadagasc1194 975 —0.0081085 4.43E+06 7.122.62.2
AsiaBanglade8461221 0.0151034 3.71E+07 6.83 3.22.6
AfricMauritan7771038 0.012 908 7.1OE+05 25.62 12.2
AfricLiberia 863 944 0.004 904 9.46E+05 21.51 2.5 3
AsiaNepal 833974 0.006904 6.24E+06 5.952.3 2
AfricTogo 777 978 0.009 878 1.25E+06 15.54 2.9 2.5
AfricGhana 1009 727 —0.013 868 4.57E+06 9.124.7 2.3
AfricCentral 838 789 —0.002814 9.66E+05 10.551.41.7
AfricSomalia 901 657 —0.013779 l.59E+06 13.811.13.1
AsiaBurma 5171031 0.028774 1.24E+07 11.453.51.7
AfricMali 737 710 —0.001 724 1.91E+06 7.32 12.2Region Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GOP/ GDP/Avg Avg AvgAvgSchoolGrowth
Adult Adult Growth GOP! GOPInvestf 1960-85
1960 1985GOP!Adult (Scale) GOP Working
Adult 60—85 60—85 60—85 Age Pop
Afric Burundi 755 663 —0.005 709 l.18E+06 5.12 0.4 1.7
Afric Burkina 529 857 0.019 693 l.76E+06 12.70 0.4 0.9
Afric Niger 539 841 0.018 690 l.79E+06 10.39 0.52.6
Afric Chad 908 462 —0.027 685 l.62E+06 6.99 0.4 1.9
Afric Sierra L511 805 0.018 658 l.33E+06 10.95 1.7 1.6
Afric Malawi 455 823 0.024 639 1.77E+06 13.23 0.6 2.4
Afric Uganda 601 667 0.004 634 3.39E+06 4.201.13.1
Afric Rwanda 460 696 0.017 578 l.26E+06 7.99 0.4 2.8
Afric Ethiopia533 608 0.005 571 1.O1E+07 5.481.12.3
Afric Tanzania383 710 0.025 547 4.61E+06 l8.0 0.52.9
Afric Zaire 594 412 —0.015 503 7.1OE+06 6.60 3.6 2.4
Notes: Gross domestic product and investment series for all countries are
measured in real 1980 international dollars. The data are taken from the Penn
World Table (Mark 4) as reported in Heston and Summers (1988). 1960 GOP per
adult, col (1), is the initial income variable used in the convergence
equations in this paper. Column (3) is the average growth of GOP peradult over
the period 1960—85. It is calculated as the log difference of 1985 and 1960 GOP
per adult, divided by 25. The total growth of GOP per adult overthe 1960-85
period is used as the dependent variable in most of the regressions.The above
data are sorted by average GOP per adult (Cal (4)) in descending order. Itis
the average of GOP per adult in 1960 and 1985. The scale variable (col (5))is
the mean GOP value for the period 1960-85. Column 6 is the averageinvestment
to GOP share for the period 1960-85 expressed in percentage terms. Itis
calculated as the mean of the investment ratios for each year 1960-85. The
variable SCHOOL is the average percentage of the working-age populationin
secondary school for the period 1960—85. The school and working agepopulation
data are from Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1985). The working—age population growth
rates are averages for the period 1960—85.A— 4
Estimationof the 8010w ResidUal for the OECD Countries:
The CES two factor production function which we use to define output qis:
q= [1 (pN)(.-l)i+
whereN is the number of people employed and K is the capital stock. 1and m
are distribution parameters in the CES function and sis the estimated
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. p is thelabour
productivity index for Harrod-neutral technical progres. Forestimation
purposes we use the time series for output attributableto each employee,
calculated by inverting the above CES production function and attributing a
sample-average rate of return to the capital stock:
lp= (q' —m.K''.)/NW
With a Cobb—Douglas production function, this series only differs by aconstant
term from the total-factor index of technology often referred to asthe Solow
residual.
For the reader interested in how we estimate the parameters ofthe CES
production function, the paper by Helliwell and Chung (1990a)contains a
complete appendix on the procedure that we use. The primary sourcesof the data
used for the 19 OECD countries are the national accounts published bythe OECD
for the industrial countries, converted to common currency using PPP exchange
rates for GDP. The capital stock and employment data are also mainlyfrom OECD
sources. Helliwell and Chung (l990a) outline the assumptionsused in the
construction of the capital stocks and also provide a detailed listing of the
data sources used.